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This paper forms part of awider, on-going research agenda that aims to
explore reputation and career concern incentives when an agent faces het-
erogeneous audiences. In almost any practical application that one could
conceive of, audiences for an agent's reputation have different preferences,
different information, or both different information and preferences. In
some applications, these differences may be sufﬁciently small that there is
little loss in ignoring them. However, in a large range of applications, differ-
ences in preferences and informationamongaudiences are substantive: Ex-
amples range from a politician facing different constituents to a credit-
rating agency building reputation with both issuers and investors, or to a
CEO dealing with shareholders, employees, suppliers and competitors.
In economicmodels, an agent's “reputation” is a probability distribu-
tion, interpreted as the common belief regarding the likelihood that
agent is of one type rather than another.1 The literature explores how
a strategic agent might take actions to affect the evolution of this belief
through time—indeed, this is the central focus of the literature. Knowl-
edge of the agent's type is useful for an audience in predicting the
agent's future behavior; in particular, if the agent is a “commitment”ent, University of Toronto, 105
(H. Bar-Isaac),
ipps (2006), and Mailath and
the literature. Another stream
ion” builds on repeated games.
. This is an open access article undertype then the agent's behavior is deterministic and completely de-
termined by his type. The agent's type is typically considered to be
unidimensional.2 Moreover, there is a monotonic ordering over types
in terms of the audience's preferences. Put differently, in existing
work, it is clear what a “good” reputation is, and the main concern has
been to understand the optimal behavior thatmight lead to (or exploit)
a good reputation. This is our point of departure in this paper.
One of our main contributions is to highlight that, with heteroge-
neous preferences, identifying a “good” reputation itself is non-trivial.
We ﬁrst focus on the question of what is a good reputation, by introduc-
ing a “return-to-reputation” function.We show that, with heterogeneous
preferences, even with a natural order over types, the reputational re-
wards for an agent may be non-monotonic in type. We then focus on
the question of how the agent's optimal action choices are affected by
reputation concerns. We take the simplest possible approach to do this,
by analyzing reputation incentives in a two-period career concerns
model. We show that non-monotonic gains to reputation also imply
that the agent's optimal action may be non-monotonic in reputation,
and can display sharp reversals in direction.
The ﬁndings in this paper are consistent with several applications.
Non-monotonic rewards to reputation arise in applications in ﬁnance,
marketing, and IO. See, for instance, Bouvard and Levy (2012) who
model credit rating agencies facing both issuers and consumers, and
show that the return to reputation can be non-monotonic. Similar2 For exceptions see Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) and Kartik and McAfee (2007).
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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versals in behavior in reputational contexts are also observed in prac-
tice. There are several examples in marketing, where a ﬁrm that faces
a horizontally differentiated market is seen to dramatically change its
advertising message from time to time. An interesting example is
Marlboro, which started out targeting women, and later reversed its
image completely to target a male audience with the “Marlboro man.”
We discuss this in more detail in Section 3.
The exposition is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the
basic framework, and establish non-monotonicity of the returns to rep-
utation in standard IO settings. In Section 3, we characterize how the
agent's optimal action is affected by reputation concerns. Here, we re-
visit the IO examples from Section 2 and show how there can be rever-
sals in the optimal action choice. Section 4 concludes.
2. Heterogeneous audiences and reward functions: examples
2.1. General framework
We consider an agent of type θ, where θ has c.d.f. F. The agent holds
this prior F commonly with the audience. The agent can take an action
a ∈ ℝ, at a cost c(a) where c′(|a|) N 0 and c″(|a|) N 0.3 In particular, for
the examples in this paper, we assume thatc að Þ ¼ 12a2. The agent's action
together which his type generate a (noisy) public signal or outcome s=
θ+ a+ εwhere ε is normally distributedwithmean 0 and,without loss
of generality, variance 1. In this paper, we consider a two-periodmodel,
and in particular, we consider the value of holding a given reputation in
a terminal period when the agent takes only a costless action. In this
case, the outcome that the agent is expected to produce depends only
on her anticipated type. Speciﬁcally, the expected outcome generated
is exactly the type of the agent, θ. An audience observes signal, s, and
uses it (together with its expectations about the agent's action) to
form a posterior belief about the agent's type. Note that observing the
signal s is equivalent to observing a signal z = s− a⁎, where a⁎ is the
expected equilibrium action. The agent then earns a payment that de-
pends on the audience's posterior belief about his type: We introduce
the notation R(G(·)) to denote the agent's reward, where G(·) denotes
the public reputation or the posterior belief that the audience has about
the agent's type. Indeed, the agent earns payment R(E[θ|z]|),4 and there-
fore, the agent's general problem is to choose an action tomaximize his
expected return, i.e., choose a to maximize Eε,0[R(E[θ|z])]− c(a).
We call the function R(·) the agent's return-to-reputation or reward
function. This is the value that an agent earns from starting a period
with a given reputation.
2.2. Benchmark example: homogeneous audience
We begin by considering the canonical case introduced in
Holmström (1999). Here, the agent is a manager with type θ drawn
from distribution F(θ), which is the normal distribution with mean μ
and variance σ2. The manager faces a competitive labor market, and
gets paid at the end of the period, based on the market's belief about
his type: In particular, the maximal willingness to pay for an expected
outcome of E(θ+ ε) = E(θ) is exactly E(θ), and a competitive market
implies that the agent receives E(θ); that is, R(E(θ)) = E(θ). Notice
that the reward to reputation is linear in the reputation level.
Below, we depart from this benchmark case, and allow audiences to
have varying preferences. We consider some commonly studied set-
tings in which the audiences may have differing preferences over3 Typically, modelers restrict attention to non-negative actions; however, as will be
clear below this can be restrictive and in someof our applications (for examplewhen a de-
notes a “horizontal” rather than “vertical” action) there is no natural interpretation for
such a restriction.
4 Note that since we ﬁx the prior distribution and signal structure throughout, in equi-
librium E[θ|z] is sufﬁcient to characterize the posterior distribution.some vertical or horizontal quality characteristic. We derive the
return-to-reputation function in these examples and show that even
in these standard settings, the return-to-reputation function is not line-
ar, and can be non-monotonic. We illustrate the reward functions in
Fig. 1.
2.3. Horizontal reputation of a monopolist
Consider a monopolist who sells a product of unknown type θ,
where θ is a horizontal characteristic. The ﬁrm faces two consumers.5
The consumers and the ﬁrm have the same common prior about the
horizontal product characteristic: As before, θ ~ N(μ, σ 2). The monopo-
list can take a costly action a to change the product characteristic. The
cost of taking action a is 12a
2.
Consumer 1's valuation of a product of quality θ is given by v1(θ)=3−
(1− θ)2, and consumer 2's valuation is given by v2(θ)=3− (1+ θ)2. This
can be interpreted as the consumers having preferences over some hori-
zontal characteristic of the product with consumer 1 having her bliss
point at θ=1 and consumer 2 at θ= –1. Each consumer can get a maxi-
mum value 3 from consuming the product. From consuming a product
whose quality is not at her bliss point, the consumer suffers a loss that is
quadratic in the distance from the bliss point.
Consumer 1when purchasing and consuming the goodwith reputa-
tion given by a normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ 2 antic-
ipates a utility of
3−
Z ∞
−∞
1−lð Þ2 e
− l−μð Þ2
2σ2
σ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2π
p dl−p ¼ 3− 1−μð Þ2−σ2−p; ð1Þ
if purchasing the good at a price p. Similarly, consumer 2 anticipates a
utility of 3− (1 + μ)2− σ 2− p.
First suppose that the monopolist can perfectly price discriminate.
Then her reward function is simply the sum of the rewards that she
would obtain by dealing with each of the two consumers entirely sepa-
rately, i.e., the monopolist would earn
R N μ;σ2
  
¼ max 0;3− 1−μð Þ2−σ2
n o
þmax 0;3− 1þ μð Þ2−σ2
n o
:
ð2Þ
Instead, if the monopolist had to charge a common price to all con-
sumers then in setting her optimal price, the monopolist can consider
three possible optimal strategies (i) not to sell, thereby earning proﬁts
of 0 (ii) sell to only one of the two consumers (a) if μ N 0 this means set-
ting p = 3− (1− μ)2− σ 2 and earning proﬁts of 3− (1− μ)2− σ2
and (b) if μ b 0 this means setting p= 3− (1− μ)2− σ2 and earning
proﬁts of V− (1 + μ)2− σ2 and (iii) sell to both consumers (a) if μ N
0 this means setting p = 3 − (1 − μ)2 − σ 2 and earning proﬁts
of 6 − 2(1 + μ)2 − 2σ 2 and (b) if μ b 0 this means setting p = 3 −
(1− μ)2− σ2 and earning proﬁts of 6− 2(1 + μ)2− 2σ2.
It follows that we can write the return function as
R N μ;σ2
  
¼ max

0;3− 1þ μð Þ2−σ2;3− 1−μð Þ2−σ2; 6−2 1þ μð Þ2−2σ2
 
1μ N0
þ 6−2 1−μð Þ2−2σ2
 
1μb0g: ð3Þ5 Here,wemodel two consumers for tractability. A continuumof consumerswith great-
er mass on extreme types would yield similar results. A uniform distribution of consumer
types would yield a single-peaked reward function.
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Fig. 1. Return-to-reputation functions.
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and has several sharp changes in direction.
2.4. Vertical reputation in a competitive environment
Consider next an example with vertical quality differentiation and
competition, in the spirit of Shaked and Sutton (1982). Suppose that
there is an incumbent whose quality is ﬁxed and known to be equal to
1.We consider the reward function for an entrant establishing a reputa-
tion for quality. The entrant has unknown quality θ drawn from a
normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ2. The quality level is
unknown to both the entrant and customers. As in the other exam-
ples, the entrant can take a costly action a to affect the quality of the
output: Anentrant of quality level θwho takes actionaproduces anoutput
z= θ+ a+ εwhere ε is drawn from a standard normal distribution.
A consumer's willingness to pay depends on his preferences for
quality and the expected quality of the product. Suppose that con-
sumers vary in their tastes for quality, denoted by t, where t is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. A consumer of type t anticipates obtaining utility
tE(θ)− pwhen consuming a good of expected quality E(θ) and price p.
Trivially if bothmonopolist and entrant could charge different prices
to different consumers then Bertrand price competition between thetwo ﬁrms implies that if the entrant's expected quality was below the
incumbent's E(θ) b 1, then itwould earn nothing. Instead, if the entrant's
quality were higher then, in equilibrium, it would charge a consumer of
type t a price of t(E(θ)− 1). In this case, the reward function would be
R μð Þ ¼
0 if μb1
μ−1
2
if 1≤μ
( )
: ð4Þ
Suppose instead that both the incumbent and the entrant cannot
price discriminate. First if E(θ) b 0, then trivially, the entrant optimizes
by not selling and earning no proﬁts since the entrant cannot charge a
positive price andmake sales. Next, suppose that the entrant's expected
quality is 0 ≤ E(θ) b 1. Then we can deﬁne consumer t1 who is indiffer-
ent between buying from the entrant and incumbent implicitly through
the equality t1E(θ)− pe = t1− pi where pe is the price charged by the
entrant and pi is the price charged by the incumbent; and deﬁne t0 as
the consumer indifferent betweenbuying from the entrant andnot buy-
ing at all, so that t0 is implicitly deﬁned by t0E(θ)− pe = 0. Then t1 ¼
pi−pe
1−E μð Þ and t0 ¼ peE θð Þ; proﬁts for the entrant are given by pe(t1 − t0) and
proﬁts for the incumbent are given by pi(1 − t1). By simultaneously
solving the ﬁrst order conditions for the proﬁts of entrant and
6 A sufﬁcient condition is that R(·) is not too convex.
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by E θð Þ 1−E θð Þ
4−E θð Þð Þ2.
Finally, suppose that 1 ≤ E(μ). Then the indifferent consumer be-
tween the entrant and incumbent is again t1 ¼ pe−piE θð Þ−1 and we can
deﬁne the type indifferent between buying from the incumbent
and not buying as t3 = pi. In this region the entrant's proﬁts
are given by pe(1 − t1) and the incumbent's proﬁts are given by
pi(t1 − t3). It can be shown that in this case, the entrant's proﬁts
are given by 4E θð Þ2 E θð Þ−1
4E θð Þ−1ð Þ2.
Overall, therefore the return function for the entrant is non-
monotonic in the prior, and is given by
R μð Þ ¼
0 if μb0
μ 1−μ
4−μð Þ2 if 0≤μb1
4μ2 1−μ
4μ−1ð Þ2 if 1bμ
8><
>:
9>=
>;: ð5Þ
The examples of vertical differentiation, and horizontal reputation
highlight that these standard IO models lead to reward functions that
are non-monotonic in the mean reputation. This non-monotonicity
can arise, in part, through aggregating the rewards thatwould be gener-
ated in dealing with individual consumers separately, as illustrated in
the case of horizontal reputation with price discrimination. However,
additional structure—common pricing decisions in the above exam-
ples—can lead to further turning points or cause non-monotonicity in
the reward function (as in the case of vertical differentiation). Indeed,
in the latter case, a simple aggregation of reputation rewards in the
case of individual audiences (the perfectly discriminating case) implies
a monotonic reward function whereas in the aggregate model with no
price discrimination, non-monotonicity arises.
As Bouvard and Levy (2012) and Frenkel (2012) highlight, in the
context of credit rating agencies, even if the agent is collecting payment
from a single audience with homogeneous preferences, the agent's rep-
utation may affect another audience in his dealings with agent's cus-
tomer and this can lead to non-monotonic rewards. Speciﬁcally, they
consider a credit rating agency building a reputation for being tough
or lax with issuers (its customers) but investors are relevant insofar as
their beliefs about the credit rating agency's behavior affect how much
they would pay for a rated issue and, thereby, how much an investor
would pay to be rated.
3. Reward functions and career concerns
Having derived the return-to-reputation function, we can now ask
what the agent's optimal action is. We begin by characterizing the opti-
mal action in the general framework at the start of Section 2.
3.1. General results
The audience's posterior belief about the agent's type θ, following an
observation of signal swhen the equilibrium action a⁎ is anticipated, is
distributed normally with mean ν ¼ hμþs−ahþ1 and precision h + 1. This
allows us to write:
Eε;θ R E θ½ jzð ½ Þ ¼
Z Z
θ;ε
R
hμ þ θþ ε þ a−a
hþ 1
 
ϕθ θð Þϕε εð Þdθdε
¼
Z
Y
R
hμ þ Y þ a−a
hþ 1
 
ϕY Yð ÞdY;
¼
Z
x
R μ þ a−a

hþ 1 þ
xﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h hþ 1ð Þ
p
 !
ϕx xð Þdx;
ð6Þ
where Y = θ + ε is normally distributed with mean μ and precision
1
h þ 1
 	−1 ¼ hhþ1 and ϕx(·) is the normal density function associatedwith the variable x. The last equality follows using a change of variables
(i.e. x ¼ Y−μﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hþ1
h
p , so dx ¼ dYﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hþ1
h
p ).
When the ﬁrst order condition applies, the agent's maximization is
the solution to
c′ að Þ ¼ 1
hþ 1
Z
R′ μ þ a−a

hþ 1 þ
xﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h hþ 1ð Þ
p
 !
ϕ xð Þdx: ð7Þ
In equilibrium a= a⁎, so that an equilibrium effort satisﬁes
c′ a
 	 ¼ 1
hþ 1
Z
R′ μ þ xﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h hþ 1ð Þ
p
 !
ϕ xð Þdx: ð8Þ
At this level of generality, it still requires proof that a solution exists
and is unique and in writing Eq. (8), we implicitly assume that R(·) is
differentiable almost everywhere and that the second order condition
is satisﬁed; that is6:
c″ a
 	
≥ 1
hþ 1ð Þ2
Z
R″ μ þ xﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h hþ 1ð Þ
p
 !
ϕ xð Þdx: ð9Þ
We maintain these assumptions throughout the remainder of this
paper. It is worthwhile to mention two features of our framework.
First, in supposing that the distribution of agent's type is normally dis-
tributed (rather than say, distributed with ﬁnite support) we are
able to fully separate the effect of changes in the mean prior from
changes in the precision. Second, in supposing that the signal is ad-
ditive in ability action and noise, we similarly avoid effects that arise
technologically from the signal-to-noise ratio varying with underly-
ing ability. These assumptions, therefore allow us to focus squarely
on how the shape of the reward function affects the strength of rep-
utation incentives; though, in applications, these other consider-
ations are likely to play a role and effects may interact. Taking the
derivative of Eq. (8) with respect to μ and rearranging allows us to
write
da
dμ
¼ 1
c″ að Þ
1
hþ 1
Z
x
R″ μ þ xﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h hþ 1ð Þ
p
 !
ϕ xð Þdx: ð10Þ
By inspecting the expression above it is easy to establish the follow-
ing result.
Proposition 1. Under the maintained assumptions on the differentiability
of R(·) and the validity of the second order condition, the agent's optimal
action choice a⁎ is increasing in reputation (μ) if the reward function
R(·) is convex and decreasing if R(·) is concave.
It is immediate from Proposition 1 above that in the setting of
Holmström (1999) with linear reward functions, the optimal action
will be independent of the reputation level. However, in general, the
optimal action for the agent can depend on the reputation level, and
can even switch signs from positive to negative. In returning to our
earlier illustrative examples we show that this is the case.
Note also that we can investigate the effect of precision of the
public signal on the agent's optimal action choice. Taking the deriv-
ative of Eq. (8) with respect to h, the precision on the reputation, and
rearranging allows us to write
da
dh
¼− 1
c″ að Þ
1
hþ 1 c
′ a
 	þ Z
x
R″ μ þ xﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h hþ 1ð Þp
 !
x
2
2hþ 1
h hþ 1ð Þð Þ32 ϕ xð Þdx:
"
ð11Þ
48 H. Bar-Isaac, J. Deb / International Journal of Industrial Organization 34 (2014) 44–50Holmström (1999) and, perhaps, simple intuition suggests that
more uncertainty leads to higher actions. To see why, note that higher
uncertainty implies that the agent's action choice is likely to have a
greater impact on posterior beliefs. This gives the agent a stronger
incentive to take costly actions. The above expression suggests that, in
general, this need not be the case. Rather, higher precision has two
effects on the agent's action. The ﬁrst effect (captured in ﬁrst term in
the square brackets) is that higher precision of the signal dampens the
agent's incentive to exert effort (or brings effort closer to 0). This effect
is the same as in the canonical case with a linear return function.7
However, there is also a second effect (captured by the second
term in the square brackets). This effect depends on the shape of
R(·) and the location of the prior, and can overwhelm the effect of
the ﬁrst term, so that greater precision may lead to more extreme
actions. The intuition is that marginal changes in the posteriors
have bigger impacts at some posteriors than others. High precision,
not only dampens the impact of the observation, but also keeps the
posterior closer to the prior. If this is where the returns to increasing
the prior are relatively high, as compared to other regions of the re-
ward function then high precision can lead to more effort than low
precision. The non-monotonicity of effort in precision in the context
of speciﬁc reward functions has been noted elsewhere; speciﬁcally,
Martinez (2009), Casas-Arce (2010) and Miklos-Thal and Ullrich
(2012).11 See Vaknin (2007). Marlboro was originally produced by Philip Morris as a woman's
cigarette. Theywere advertised as being ‘Mild asMay’ for the female palate and had ‘Ivory
Tips’ to ‘protect the lip’…quite a different image from the masculine symbol it was to
become…(p.45). Even in 1951, Philip Morris was using this particularly strange image of
an adorable infant with a baby-pink background to sell cigarettes to mothers… The early
‘new’ Marlboro advertisements in 1954 pictures images of men who typiﬁed ‘masculine
conﬁdence’… Later the campaign was reﬁned by the Leo Burnett advertising agency to
the image that was to endure all over the world for the next thirty years, the Marlboro
cowboy and ‘Marlboro Country’. (p.69–70).3.2. Optimal action in examples with heterogeneous preferences
Let us now revisit the examples in Section 2. Given the reward func-
tions characterized in Section 2, we can characterize equilibrium effort
as a function of the prior reputation, or as a function of precision. In
Fig. 2, we apply the expression Eq. (8) to plot the agent's optimal action
at different reputation levels (for precision h(=σ−2) = 10). Recall also
that the cost of taking action a is given by c að Þ ¼ a22 so that c′(a) = a.
As the ﬁrst panel in Fig. 2 suggests, in the canonical Holmström
(1999) framework with homogenous audience preferences, the agent's
optimal action is independent of the starting reputation.8 However, this
is no longer true if we consider heterogenous preferences. In general,
the agent's optimal action can be increasing or decreasing in the initial
reputation, and for small changes in the initial reputation, the optimal
action may change discontinuously and even change sign.
Consider, the examplewith horizontal differentiation.We know that
the return function of the monopolist can display sharp changes in di-
rection. Panels (ii) and (iii) show that, consequently, the optimal action
can be non-monotonic and display reversals as well.
One application is to advertising decisions in a market with hor-
izontal differentiation. A ﬁrmmay choose its advertising to highlight
some aspects of its product rather than others, and by stressing par-
ticular aspects, or by investing in marketing an image, a ﬁrm can
develop a “horizontal reputation.” As a concrete example, the tobac-
co industry is a prominent example of a relatively homogeneous
good, where different products have been marketed to develop
particular horizontal reputations.9,10 It is noteworthy that brands
have entirely reversed their marketing strategies; for example, the7 Recall we allow for negative values of a⁎, but whether a⁎ is positive or negative the
term− a1þh moves the optimal action towards 0.
8 As mentioned above, this can be seen directly from Proposition 1.
9 As an example, see Vaknin, 2007 citing Alan Blum that…the brand of cigarette of cig-
arette you smoked often marked you as a fan of a particular baseball team: New York Gi-
ants fans would probably smoke a Chesterﬁeld, a Yankee fan Camels and Lucky Strike
would be preferred by Dodgers supporters p.9.
10 This example may be imperfect in the sense that changes in marketing strategy are
likely to leave persistent effects on a brand's image,while in our two-periodmodel, the ef-
fect of actions is necessarily temporary. However, we conjecture that allowing for more
persistent effects of actions would yield similar non-monotonicities and reversals in the
optimal action choice.Marlboro brand, associated with the “Marlboro man” was originally
intended and marketed as a feminine brand to appeal to women.11
This is consistent with our simple reduced form model where sto-
chastic realizations might lead a ﬁrm to reverse the direction of its
branding.12
Similarly, as Fig. 2 illustrates in panel (v), in amodelwith vertical dif-
ferentiation (and where the ﬁrm cannot discriminate between cus-
tomers and competes with a rival of known quality), the ﬁrm may
prefer to take positive or negative actions that raise or lower perceived
quality depending on the initial reputation. Again small changes in ini-
tial reputation can lead to reversals in marketing strategies, consistent
with changes in the advertising of Pabst Blue Ribbon beer in the 1940s
from a luxury or high-end product closer to its current perception as
more an everyman's drink.134. Conclusions
When there are several audiences with heterogeneous preferences,
then determining what a “good” reputation is a non-trivial exercise, as
illustrated in Section 2. Indeed, horizontal differentiation is not neces-
sary: Even when an agent is establishing a reputation for quality, then
a standard model of vertical differentiation highlights that a ﬁrm
could gain from a reputation for lower or higher quality.We summarize
the payoffs associated with different reputation levels in a “returns-to-
reputation function” and argue that with heterogeneous audiences, it is
natural that this function be non-monotonic. Section 3 highlights that
this has implications for reputation-building: Depending on an agent's
initial reputation, the agent's optimal choice of action may reverse sign.
A limitation of our analysis is that we consider only a two-period
model. In many applications, the assumption that there is a single peri-
od inwhich reputation is established is unrealistic. Theremay, however,
be cases where it is realistic to think of a ﬁrm or agent's life as divided
between a reputation-building stage and a stagewhere there are no fur-
ther learning opportunities orwhere any learning is largely irrelevant.14
Extending the analysis beyond two periods, however, is difﬁcult since
the continuation value in any non-terminal period depends on the car-
dinal values of the actions to be taken in the future, and thus requires
characterization not only of the comparative statics of actions but also
their absolute values (and speciﬁcally the costs of these actions) as in-
puts into continuation values. 15 Further, in the two-period model, the
audiences perfectly anticipate the agent's action, and the agent and
audiences hold the same beliefs. However, in a multi-period model,
the long-run agent's incentives on the equilibrium path are determined12 There is related literature on advertising inmarkets with horizontal differentiation. In
particular, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) demonstrate that the market-determined level
of informative advertisingmaybe socially excessive, and that cheaper advertising technol-
ogies may lead to more severe price competition and reduced proﬁts. Anand and Shachar
(2011) provide empirical support for an informative rather than persuasive role for adver-
tising, highlighting, in particular, that exposure to informative advertising on a horizontal
characteristic leads some consumers to reduce their demand for the good. This literature
supposes that consumers either learn the characteristic or not, and not that the ﬁrm takes
costly actions to change public perception of the good.
13 See, for example, http://bluebomber.wordpress.com/2008/11/page/2/ for the evolu-
tion of Pabst Blue Ribbon advertising.
14 Examples include academic tenure and the period as associate prior to a partnership
decision in consulting and law ﬁrms.
15 Indeed, such dynamics in themselves can lead to non-monotonic reward functions
even with a homogeneous audience, as shown in Kartik and Van Weelden (2013).
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Fig. 2. Optimal action and reputation.
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Evaluating the agent's off-equilibrium payoffs is challenging be-
cause, after a deviation takes place, the agent acquires private in-
formation about his type, and the public (audience's) beliefs and
private (agent's) beliefs are no longer aligned. The agent can thus
condition his actions on both the private and public beliefs, and
the audience may be constructing posterior beliefs using an incor-
rect conjecture about the agent's actions. Thus, analyzing multi-
period problems is likely to be involved, and would require impos-
ing considerably more structure on the single-period cost and
reward functions.
This paper is a ﬁrst step in our larger agenda of understanding
reputation building with multiple audiences. Here, we highlight
that in the presence of heterogeneous audience preferences, charac-
terizing the value of reputation (and consequently, describing opti-
mal behavior) is subtle, and qualitatively different from a setting
with homogeneous preferences. In related and ongoing work, we
explore other considerations that arise when building reputation
with heterogeneous audiences.
Clearly, an agent's reputation incentives are determined by the pref-
erences and information of the audiences that the agent faces. Conse-
quently, to the extent that the agent is able to choose the audiencesthat he faces, he can, in effect, commit to particular behaviors. We ex-
plore this idea in an ongoing work, Bar-Isaac and Deb (2013) that ana-
lyzes the reputational incentives that drive the optimal choice of a
ﬁrm's portfolio of clients.
In another paper Bar-Isaac and Deb (forthcoming), we consider het-
erogeneity in information held by different audiences. Speciﬁcally, we
study reputational incentives of an agent who faces two audiences
with opposed preferences and allow the audiences to have the same
or different information about the agent's actions. We consider two
polar cases: one in which the two audiences have identical information,
and another in which each audience has different information. We
show that reputation is necessarily bad (has no disciplining effect)
when the audiences have different information, in the sense that the
agent's average per-period payoff is lower than it would be in a one-
shot interaction.
Audiences with heterogeneous preferences raise a range of new is-
sues including the agent's uncertainty about audience preferences, au-
diences' uncertainty about the other audiences that an agent faces,
and more broadly, richer and multi-dimensional notions of reputation
that incorporate audiences' higher-order beliefs about each other's be-
liefs. We believe that this presents an exciting ﬁeld for new theory
and applications.
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